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Criminal Law: The Missing
Element in Sentencing Reform
Michael H. Tonry*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in sentencing reform. have occurred
against a background of mounting dissatisfaction with the indeterminate sentencing system that has pervaded the United States for
much of the twentieth century.1 The sentencing reform movement
has been underway in earnest since 1976.2 The Alaska Attorney
General banned all forms of plea bargaining in 1975,3 and the
United States Parole Commission's guidelines have been in effect
for several years.4 Denver has adopted the first descriptive sentencing guidelines system.5 The California legislature enacted the California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law in 1976.6 Several
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. B.A., 1966, University of North Carolina;
LL.B., 1970, Yale University. Preparation of this Article was supported in part by a grant
from the National Institute of Corrections.
1. For comprehensive surveys of recent sentencing reform developments, see von
Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in America: An Overview, 27 CRIME &
DsLINQ. 289 (1981); 4 ART AssocTES, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS (National Institute of
Justice 1980);

CRIMINAL COURTS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PRoJECT, OvERvIEw oF STATE AND
LOCAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND SENTENCING RESEARCH AcTrTY (American University
Law Institute 1980) [hereinafter cited as OvRvw].

2. Although the first major institutional developments date from about that time, several influential books appeared some years earlier. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERIiCE
COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973); N. MORRIS,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).
3. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING
(1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 122 & 168.

4. United States Parole Commission Rules, 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.60 (1981); see infra
notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
5. See L. WILKINS, J. KRESs, D. GOTrFREDSON, J. CALPIN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION (National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice 1978) [hereinafter cited as L. WUKiNS]; W. RICH, L. SUTTON, T. CLEAR, AND
M.

SAKS, SENTENCING

GUIDELINES: THEIR

OPERATION AND IMPACT ON THE COURTS

(National

Center for State Courts 1980) [hereinafter cited as W. RICH]. See also infra text accompanying notes 87-94.
6. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139 (as amended); see infra notes 95-102 and accompanying
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states, including New York7 and Massachusetts, 8 have enacted
mandatory sentencing laws, and Maine adopted a determinate sentencing statute and abolished its parole board in 1976. 9 By 1981,
most states either had considered or planned to consider major
changes in sentencing laws, institutions, and procedures. 10
Although indeterminate sentencing systems vary in significant

respects from state to state, the similarities are marked. In the
model form of indeterminate sentencing procedures, the legislature
sets maximum lawful sentences, the judge sets the maximum-and

sometimes minimum-terms, and the parole authorities decide
when to release prisoners. The judge and the parole board possess
immense discretion to individualize punishment decisions to meet

the peculiar needs of each offender. In most jurisdictions, appellate
courts lack authority to review the judge's sentencing decision or
the parole board's release decision."'
Two aspects of indeterminate sentencing-immense discretion1 2 and freedom from review's-are the targets of many sentencing reform initiatives. The establishment of sentencing standards
and review procedures is necessary and laudable, but it is not sufficient to achieve genuine improvement in the justness of sentencing
in America. Under indeterminate sentencing laws, the substantive
criminal law is not especially important; once the defendant has
been convicted of an offense, the sentencing judge is entitled to
impose any lawful sentence, and no connection need exist between
the defendant's wrongdoing and his punishment. Whether a defendant is convicted of armed robbery, robbery, theft, or assault is
unimportant as long as the statutory sentence maximums do not
constrain the judge's sentencing choices and his ability to individualize the sentence he imposes.'
7. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, THE NATION'S
TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEw YORK EXPERIENCE (1977) [hereinafter cited as
JOINT COMMITTEE]. See also infra note 117 and accompanying text.
8. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10 (1980). See Beha, "And Nobody Can Get You
Out"--The Impact of a Mandatory Prison Sentence for the Illegal Carryingof a Firearm
on the Use of Firearmsand on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Boston (pts. 1-2),
57 B.U.L. REV. 96, 289 (1977); see also infra text accompanying notes 110-11.
9. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1151-1254 (Supp. 1981). See Zarr, Sentencing, 28
ME. L. REV. 117 (Special Issue 1976). Maine's parole board, Ms. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 34, 88
1671-79, was abolished in 1975 by 1975 Me. Laws ch. 499, § 71.
10. See von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 299 n.27.
11. Id. at 289-94.
12. See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent
Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978).
13. See P. UTZ, SE'TLING THE FAcTs: DIsCRErxON AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT
t
(1978).
14. If the maximum authorized sentences for armed robbery, robbery, theft, and assault are twenty-five years, twelve years, six years, and three years respectively, the judge
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The thesis of this Article is that the substantive criminal law
is the missing element in sentencing reform. If comprehensive sentencing reform strategies are to have lasting effect, legislatures
must reintroduce the criminal law to the sentencing process. This
step will require a rekindled interest in a moral analysis of the substantive criminal law and the enactment of greatly reduced statutory sentence maximums, along with more conventional institutional changes to structure discretion and increase official
accountability.
Objections to American sentencing procedures range from the
principled to the practical. Part II of this Article summarizes the
basic objections that have influenced recent sentencing initiatives.
All concern the unstructured discretion and absence of official accountability that characterize indeterminate sentencing. Part III
then outlines the sentencing law reforms that have been proposed
or adopted in response to these objections. Part IV asserts and attempts to demonstrate that sentencing in America has been divorced from the criminal law, and that present reform proposals
are inadequate because they fail to address this separation. At
trial, constitutional rights, the law of evidence, and the criminal
burden of proof provide the defendant with important procedural
safeguards. In addition, the state must meet all substantive criminal law requirements before the defendant can be convicted. Most
convictions, however, result from guilty pleas.15 In these cases trial
rights and protections are unimportant. Under an indeterminate
sentencing scheme, defendants have virtually no rights at sentencing except for procedural rights such as the rights to counsel and
to present and contest evidence. 16 A court, therefore, can convict
and sentence a defendant without ever applying substantive criminal law requirements. The new sentencing reforms have not addressed this systemic flaw. Thus, part V of this Article argues that
the logic and effect of sentencing reform proposals require that the
criminal law be returned to the sentencing process. VFinally, part VI
who wishes to impose a five-year sentence would be constrained only if the defendant was
convicted of assault.
15.

NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, SOURCEBOOK OF

CRIMINAL JUSTIcE STATISTICS-1978, table 5.19 (guilty plea rates vary from place to place

but are typically in the 85%-95% range) & 5.30 (85% of federal convictions in 1977 resulted
from guilty pleas).
16. For a comprehensive review of the law, see ABA TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING ALTERNATIVE AND PROCEDURES, SENTENCING ALTERNATmS AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1979), Pt.
VI, Standards 18-6.1 to 18-6.9 and supporting commentary [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE].
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sketches the contours of a comprehensive sentencing reform package that would go a long way towards accomplishing this result.
II.

THE HARBINGERS OF REFORM

Indeterminate sentencing was an invention of the early twentieth century. 17 Before 1900 judges set precise terms of incarceration
for most defendants. In 1900 only six states provided for probation. 18 A handful of states permitted parole, but generally only for
first offenders in reformatories. 1 ' By 1920, thirty-three states permitted adult probation, and all states permitted juvenile probation.20 By 1923, approximately half of all persons sentenced to
state prisons were under an indeterminate sentence, and slightly
more than half of all releases were under parole.2 1
Historians differ in their explanations of the abrupt changes
during the early 1900's in the penal sanctioning system. 22 Some
suggest that the changes were a reaction to the brutality and ineffectiveness of the prisons, which were themselves a hopeful reform
of the first half of the nineteenth century.23 The more likely answer, however, lies in a series of intellectual developments concerning the causes of crime and methods of crime prevention. First, the
early developers of social work and settlement houses offered environmental accounts of crimes and attributed the origins of crime to
ghetto poverty and social disruption.2 4 Suggested remedies included social programs aimed at improving the moral and economic condition of the ghetto and individualized efforts to provide
delinquents with role models, discipline, material resources, and
new opportunities.2 Second, newly influential psychiatrists and
psychologists argued that criminal behavior was the result of the
personal pathology of the individual.26 Thus, criminals increasingly
began to receive individualized analysis, case work, and treatment
17. D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 43-S1 (1980).
1S. Id. at 44.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. See also U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, Vo. 2, Probation; vol. 4, Parole (1939).
22. See B. McKELvEY, AMERICAN PRISONS chs. 4-9 (1977); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC chs. 10-11 (1971).
See generally D. ROTHMAN, supra note 17, at 17-40.
23. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 17, at 17-18.

24. Id. at 50-54.
25. See id. at 53.
26. Id. at 54-58.

1982]

SENTENCING REFORM

programs. 2 7 Last, the eugenics movement of the time explained
criminal deviance as partly the result of heredity.28 Since individuals are not responsible for their hereditary traits, the eugenicists
questioned the incarceration of criminals for behavior that was

based on these traits.2 According to David Rothman, the leading
historian of early twentieth century criminal justice institutions,
these conceptual developments and the social movements they precipitated pointed to a single solution to the problems of crime:

"[T]he origins of deviancy had to be uncovered through a case-bycase study, an individual approach. Ameliorative action had to be
fitted specifically to each individual's special needs, and therefore
required a maximum of flexibility and discretion. 30 The resultant
indeterminate sentencing system delegated virtually unfettered
discretion to judges and parole boards, endured unchallenged into
the 1960's,31 and underwent major changes only in the 1970's.
The history of the sentencing reform movement remains to be
written. For reasons that are unclear, indeterminate sentencing retained general acceptablity for three quarters of a century 2 and
then lost much of its credibility within a few years. 3 The principal
causes of this change presumably included developments such as
the prisoners' rights and civil rights movements,3 loss of faith in
the rehabilitative ideal,35 and demands throughout the legal system
for greater accountability in official decisionmaking processes. 6
Four overriding concerns permeate recent sentencing critiques
and reform proposals: disparity in sentencing, discrimination in
27. Id.
28. Id. at 58-59.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 50.
31. But see F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964).
32. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 17, at 1-13. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
Indeterminate sentencing was the pattern in every American state in 1975 when Maine abolished its parole board and thereby became the first modern "determinate" sentencing jurisdiction. MR. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1151-1254 (Supp. 1981).
33. See von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 289; Crump, Determinate Sentencing: The Promises and Perils of Sentence Guidelines, 68 Ky. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1979-80).
34. Zimring, Prisoners, Professors, and Politicians-TheOrigins of Sentencing Reform, 2 N. ILL. L. REV. (1982) (forthcoming).
35. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SEavicz COMM., supra note 2; Martinson, What
Works? Questions and Answers About PrisonReform, 10 Pun. INTEREST 22 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires notice of
accusations and opportunity to respond); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)
(prison disciplinary procedures established); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (minimum procedural requirements for probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (minimum procedural requirements for parole revocation).
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sentencing, normlessness, and irresponsibility.3 7 A fifth concern is
the apparent ineffectiveness of indeterminate sentencing in reducing or controlling crime.3 8
A.

Disparity in Sentencing

Compelling evidence suggests that sentencing in America is
often unacceptably disparate, and that the identity of the decisionmaker rather than the offender's crime and past criminal conduct is frequently the critical element in sentence determination.39
For more than a half century, research consistently has demonstrated the existence of significant, unexplained disparities in sentencing.4 Sophisticated statistical analyses are able to account for
only one-third of the variations in sentences." In several wellknown experiments researchers asked trial judges to review
presentence reports and to indicate the sentences that they would
impose. The results demonstrated that for the same defendant,
some judges would impose probation and other judges would impose a lengthy prison sentence.4
B.

Discriminationin Sentencing

Reformers have asserted repeatedly that sentencing is racially
discriminatory, and that blacks, Hispanics, and native Americans
receive harsher sentences than whites.4 Numerous social science
37. See, e.g., M. FRAKEL, supra note 2; N. MORRIS, supra note 2; A. VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
38. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME (1975). For a review of the scientific control strategies, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCE, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ON CRIME RATES (1978).
39. See Green, Research on Disparities,in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 529 (L. Badzinowicz

& M. Wolfgang eds. 1971).

40. Id.; see also Gaudet, Harris & St. John, Individual Differences in the Sentencing
Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. CaiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933).
41. For a review of the evidence, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM ch. 2 (1983) (forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH ON SENTENCING].

See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY
INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND SOCIAL RESEARCH AND YANKELOVICH, SKELLY, AND WHITE,
INC., FEDERAL SENTENCING: TOWARD A MORE EXPLICIT POLICY OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ch. 3
42.
(1974);

(1980) (Sentencing Goals and the DisparityIssue).
43. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., supra note 2;

NATIONAL MINORITY
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE INEQUALITY OF JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE INTHE MINORITY COMMUNITY (Law Enforcement Assis-

tance Administration 1980); Joyner, Legal Theories for Attacking Racial Disparityin Sentencing, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 101 (1982).
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researchers have investigated discrimination in sentencing."" Research covering periods before 1969 provides compelling evidence
of sentencing discrimination-especially in the South-both in
capital cases and in cases with black offenders and white victims."5
The evidence for periods since 1969, however, is inconclusive and
inconsistent." Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that some
judges discriminate on the basis of race. The gross disproportion in
black/white imprisonment rates-the ratio is approximately nine
to one4'7 -appears to present a prima facie case of substantial racial discrimination in sentencing. Nevertheless, the black overrepresentation in prison-forty-eight percent of the prison population
in 1979,48 compared with thirteen percent of the general population-is consistent with black overrepresentation both among persons arrested for serious crimes and among persons identified by
victims as the perpetrators of crimes. 4 Thus, the evidence does not
necessarily support the claim that sentencing is substantially racially discriminatory. Since nearly half the inmates of federal and
state prisons are black, however, many people quite naturally believe that sentencing is racially discriminatory.
C. Normlessness in Sentencing
Reformers contend that indeterminate sentencing is normless
because the moral distinctions that are discernible in the criminal
law bear no necessary relation to punishment. 50 The substantive
44. For reviews of the literature, see D. TOMPKINS, SENTENCING THE OFFENDER-A BinLIOGR"PHY (1971); Green, Inter- and Intra-RacialCrime Relative to Sentencing, 55 J. ClIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 348 (1964); Green, supra note 39; Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 357 (1974); Hagan and Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and
Critique of Sentencing Research, in RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 41; Overby, Discrimination Against Minority Groups, in CIME AND JuSTICE, supra note 39, at 569.
45. See Green, supra note 39; Hagan and Bumiller, supra note 44.
46. RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 41, ch. 2. But see Zeisel, Race Bias in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456
(1981). Professor Zeisel sees a clear pattern of continuing discrimination and places the
blame on the prosecutor. Id. at 468.
47. U.S. DEP'T or JUSTICE, BuREAu Or JUSTCE STATISTICS, BULLETIN: PRISONS AND
PasoNEaS (1980).

48. Id. In November 1979, the racial distribution of state prisoners was 49.6% white,
47.8% black, and 2.5% "other."
49. Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 Am. Soc.
REv. 93 (1978).
50. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL
CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); Richards, Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law, 13 GA. L. REv. 1395 (1979).
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law, for example, scales offenses according to the seriousness of the
act.5 ' The sentence imposed for robbery, however, need not be less
than that imposed for armed robbery. Similarly, the criminal law
contains formal mitigations such as the defenses of provocation,
extreme emotional disturbance, and diminished capacity that serve
to reduce the severity of the offense.52 The sentence, on the other
hand, is not necessarily less severe when the mitigation is present.
In recent years a resurgence of interest has emerged in punishment philosophies that closely relate punishment to blameworthiness. 53 A retributive, "just deserts" approach is widely discussed
and firmly supported" and attaches high priority to the achievement of equality and proportionality in punishment.5 5
In contrast, the indeterminate sentencing systems were based
on utilitarian premises in which blameworthiness was not the primary sentence determinant. A utilitarian punishment philosophy,
according to H.L.A. Hart, is "forward looking" to the preventive
effects of punishment such as rehabilitation, incapacitation, and
deterrence." A retributive punishment scheme, on the other hand,
is "backward looking" to the defendant's culpability and, perhaps,
to the harm that he caused or threatened. 57 Indeterminate sentencing laws are forward looking in Hart's sense and are not concerned
primarily with the sentencing values of equality, proportionality,
and moral culpability. Academics and reform activists, as well as
legislatures, have criticized this normlessness.55 Consequently, new
sentencing statutes, for example, specify that "the purpose of imprisonment . . . is punishment,"59 and that "commensurate"

deserts 0 should be the primary determinant of sentences.
51. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (Official Draft 1962).
52. See, e.g., id. §§ 4.01-4.10 (defenses of mental illness or defect), §§ 210.3(1)(b), .6
(3)-(4) (mental or emotional disturbance reduces severity of homicide offense).
53. See, e.g., A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 37.
54. See, e.g., N. MoRRIs, supra note 2, at 59-60; see also infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
55. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 37, at 66-76.
56. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPoNsmimrrv 72-83 (1968).
57. Id. at 81-82.
58. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 2; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 37. See generally
Committee Report, Indeterminate Sentencing, 35 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 61 (1980); Crump,
supra note 33; Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1103;
Kennedy, Introduction, Symposium on Sentencing, Part 1, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1978);
Meyerson, The Board of Prison Terms and Parolesand Indeterminate Sentencing: A Critique, 51 WASH. L. REV. 617 (1976).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
60. OR. REv. STAT. § 144.780(2) (1981).
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D. Irresponsibilityin Sentencing

A fourth criticism of indeterminate sentencing is that it is
"lawless." 1 Indeterminate sentencing allows judges-often influenced greatly by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and probation officers-to impose any sentence authorized by law. The range of
sentence that is legally permitted often extends from probation to
a long prison term.62 Furthermore, statutes seldom require judges
to indicate the reasons for the sentences that they impose, and no
credible mechanisms exist for review of individual sentences. Thus,
judges are not accountable for their sentencing decisions. In contrast, judges in most civil cases routinely indicate the reasons for
their holdings. Decisions in civil matters also are subject to review
of both the legal analysis and the application of the law to the
facts.' s Moreover, due process requires criminal justice officials in
other punishment contexts such as prison disciplinary hearings
and parole revocation proceedings to give their reasons for any actions that are contrary to an offender's interests." In sum, traditional indeterminate sentencing procedures have become an
anomaly.
E.

Crime Control

Critics of traditional sentencing practices argue that indeterminate sentencing and rehabilitative correctional programs have
not controlled or reduced crime.'5 For the past decade, increasing
attention has been given to deterrent and incapacitative crime control strategies. "6 Millions of federal dollars have been spent on deterrence and incapacitation research. Many jurisdictions have established "career criminal" prosecution units with mandates to
identify and prosecute repetitive violent offenders. The goal of
such units is to imprison and thereby incapacitate repetitive of61.
62.
robbery.
63.
a person

Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1972).
For example, the Tennessee Code prescribes a minimum term of five years for
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Supp. 1981). The maximum term is execution. Id.
For a colorful contrast between the respective opportunities of appellate review of
sentenced to prison and an unsuccessful party in civil litigation, see M. FRANKEL,

supra note 2, at 75.
64. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary procedures); Gagnon
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (parole revocation).
65. The preventive effects of punishment are too extensive to be addressed in this
Article. See supra note 38 for several introductory sources.
66. See NATIoNAL AcADEMY OF SCIENCE, supra note 38; E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note
38; J. WILSON, supra note 38.
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fenders. Mandatory minimum sentence laws represent efforts both
to deter prospective offenders-by the threat of certain and severe
punishment-and to incapacitate those persons who ignore the
law's admonition. These strategies, however, are difficult to implement when judges and parole boards have unfettered discretion in
punishment decisions. According to these critics, sentencing can be
an effective crime control weapon only if punishments are harsher,
more certain, or both.
These five sentencing concerns-disparity, discrimination,
normlessness, irresponsibility, and crime control-have coalesced
into a compelling case against indeterminate sentencing and have
been the harbingers of recent reform. Although indeterminate sentencing has enjoyed almost universal support throughout much of
this century, a remarkable coalition of prisoners' groups, reformers,
and bureaucrats became convinced by the late 1970's that the indeterminate sentencing era was at its end. 7
HI.

THE CURRENT SHAPE OF REFORM

Current sentencing reform strategies aim in various ways to
diminish the scope of officials' discretion, to establish general standards for decisionmaking, and to enhance official accountability.
Each of these aims in effect constitutes a repudiation of indeterminate sentencing. Recent sentencing reform initiatives include the
Model Penal Code's system of offense classification,68 the creation
of statutory presumptions favoring particular sentencing decisions,6 9 requirements that reasons for sentences be stated, 0 sentencing councils,7 1 sentencing institutes,7 2 and appellate review of

sentences.7 3 These sentencing initiatives, however, are not inconsistent with indeterminacy and are not discussed at length here. Instead, this part of the Article introduces the major sentencing re67. See, e.g., Messinger & Johnson, California's Determinate Sentencing Statute:
History and Issues, in STRATEGIES FOR DETERM.NATE SENTENCING - (National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 1978).
68. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.0-251.4 (Official Draft 1962). The Model Penal Code
has been adopted in more than 30 states.
69.

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.7 (West Supp. 1982). See also supra notes

95-105 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Criminal Code Reform Bill, S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. § 2003 (1981).
71. See generally von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 1.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976) (sentence limited to a term "not disproportionate" to that for base offense). See generally MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12302(c) (1980).
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form measures that contain structural changes which are designed
to remedy the problems described in part H by substantially altering the discretions delegated to prosecutors, judges, and parole
boards. These reform measures, which are discussed below in turn,
include parole guidelines, descriptive sentencing guidelines, presumptive sentencing, mandatory minimum sentences, parole abolition, and plea bargaining bans.
A.

Parole Guidelines

The United States parole guidelines emanated from the Parole
Decisionmaking Project of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency Research Center, in collaboration with the United States
Board of Parole. One phase of that project was an attempt to identify the weights that decisionmakers gave to various criteria in the
parole decision. A study of those criteria showed that decisionmakers' primary concerns were the severity of the offense, the
prisoner's parole prognosis, and his institutional behavior, and that
"a parole board's decisions could be predicted fairly accurately by
knowledge of its ratings on these three factors." 74 The project developed a statistical model that made explicit the Parole Board's
implicit policies. Thus, the guidelines were "descriptive" of past
practices.7" The United States Board of Parole initiated the first
parole guidelines system in 1972 as part of a pilot project to test
the feasibility of regionalizing the parole board's operation. In1976
the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act " modified the parole guidelines that had been developed in the Parole Commission's Northeast Region and then adopted them for use in the entire federal system. 77 Current guidelines are expressed in matrix
format, as shown in Table I: the vertical axis contains six offense
categories and the horizontal axis contains four parole prognosis
categories.
74.

Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Making Paroling Policy Explicit, 21

CRIME & DELINQ. 34, 37 (1975).
75.

See generally D. GOTrFREDSON, L. WKNms & P. HorFnmN, GUmELINS FOR PAROLE

AND SENTENCING

76.

5 U.S.C.

(1978).

§ 5108 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3655, 4201-4218, 5005-5006,

5010, 5014-5021, 5041 (1976).
77. On the development of the U.S. parole guidelines, see D. GOTrrFEDSON, L. WILKINS
& P. HOFFMAN, supra note 75.
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TABLE 1
U.S. PAROLE GUIDELINES (ADULTS)
Offender Characteristics
Offense Severity

Very Good

Good

Fair

Poor

Low

0-6 months

6-9 months

9-12 months

12-16 months

Low moderate

0-8

8-12

12-16

16-22

Moderate

10-14

14-18

18-24

24-32

High

14-20

20-26

26-34

34-44

Very High

24-36

36-48

48-60

60-72

Greatest I

40-52

52-64

64-78

78-100

Greatest II

52+

64+

78+

100+

Source: U.S. Parole Commission, Rules § 2-20 (Eff. Sept. 1, 1981); 28 C.F.R. 2-20.

When setting release dates, hearing examiners determine the
category within which the prisoner's criminal conduct falls. The
examiners then calculate the prisoner's salient factor score, which
is based on the predicted recidivism rates of persons sharing certain characteristics with the prisoner. After consulting the cell at
which the applicable offense severity row and parole prognosis column intersect, parole officials in the ordinary case set a release
date that is consistent with the range which is identified in this
78

cell.

Florida,7 ' Georgia,80 New York, 1 Oklahoma, 2 Oregon, 8 and
Utah" have adopted similar parole guidelines. Minnesota and
Washington adopted and have since repealed matrix parole guidelines. Minnesota abolished parole release.8 5 Washington first
adopted a different parole guideline format and later abolished its
78. United States Parole Commission Rules, 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.60 (1981).
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 947.16-.18 (1982).
80. GA. CODE ANN. § 77-512.1 (1981).
81. NEw YORK PENAL LAW § 70.40 (Consol. 1981-1982).
82. The Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board implemented matrix-type parole guidelines without a legislative mandate, on April 1, 1980.
83. 1977 Or. Laws cl. 372.
84. The Utah guidelines were drafted by the research staff of the Utah Department of
Corrections.
85. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 244.01-11 (West Supp. 1982). For a general review of these
developments, see R. SPARKS, A. VON HIRSCH & S. MESSINGER, PROJECT ON STRATEGIS FOR
DrRmiNATE SENTENCING (a forthcoming federally funded comprehensive review of sentencing reform developments); von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 1.
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parole board effective July 1, 1988.86
B.

Descriptive Sentencing Guidelines

Descriptive sentencing guidelines originated in Denver and resulted from an effort to apply the research experience and statistical technology that had been developed in establishing the United
States parole guidelines.8s Researchers collected data on a sample
of cases and subjected this data to statistical analyses to identify
those offense and offender variables that best "explained" the
sentences imposed. The premise of this initial study was that "the
gradual build-up of case-by-case decisions results in the incremental development of a sentencing policy."" Thus, the Denver guidelines were descriptive because they were purportedly based on the
past practices of the Denver courts, as shown by the statistical
analyses, and were constructed so approximately eighty-five percent of the sentences in the sample of cases fell within the sentencing ranges contained in the guidelines.8s The Denver guidelines
and most other descriptive sentencing systems, therefore, are in
the matrix format of the United States parole guidelines.
Judicial compliance with the resulting empirically informed
matrix guidelines is wholly voluntary. " The developers postulated
that the guidelines' descriptive character would make them inherently credible, and, consequently, that judges would comply with
them and "significantly reduce unjustified variation from the norm
by making the established policy of the court explicit." 91 The Denver guidelines took effect in 1976. Subsequent generations of federally funded projects have developed descriptive sentencing guidelines in Newark, Chicago, and Phoenix, and, at the state level, in
Maryland and Florida." Alaska, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, and Washington also have developed statewide descriptive
sentencing guidelines.'8 According to one recent survey, as of April
1, 1981, twenty-three states had implemented or were developing
descriptive sentencing guidelines.'"
86.

See WASH. REv. COns ANN. § 9.95.009 (Supp. 1982).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra note 4.
See W. Ricm, supra note 5, at
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 31.
Id.
See J. KRES, PRUsCmRnoN FOR JUsTICE (1980).
See von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 1.
See Ovmwviw, supra note 1.
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Presumptive Sentencing

California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Acts is an example of a presumptive sentencing scheme. The Act establishes a
detailed sentencing scheme that specifies mitigated, normal, and
aggravated prison sentences for defendants convicted of particular
felonies." The middle term is the presumptive base. The Act directs the judges to impose the middle or normal term in the ordinary case, though the judge may, consistent with criteria established by the California Judicial Council, impose the higher or
lower terms to reflect aggravating or mitigating circumstances.' 7 In
addition, the California Act directs the judge to increase the term
variously by one to three years if specific aggravating factors such
as weapon possession or use,'8 personal injuries,"9 or great property
loss or damage 00 are "charged and admitted or found true." 101 Finally, the Act directs the judge to increase the sentence by specified amounts if the defendant has been incarcerated previously for
felony convictions.1 02 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New Mexico, and North Carolina have
enacted similar presumptive sentencing statutes with much less
detailed standards. 08
Minnesota,1 0 Pennsylvania, 0 5 and Washington""s have created
sentencing commissions and have charged them with establishing
presumptive sentencing guidelines. The Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission has promulgated detailed guidelines in the
familiar matrix format. These guidelines specify narrow ranges of
presumptive sentences-typically five percent on either side of a
95. CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 1170-1170.7 (West Supp. 1982).
96. Three prison terms are specified for every offense. For example, the sentences for
robbery are two, three, or five years. Id. § 213.
97. Id. § 1170.
98. Id. § 12022.5.
99. Id. § 12022.7.
100. Id. § 12022.6.
101. Id. § 667.5(d).
102. Id. 667.5.
103. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.005-.185 (1968); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (1978);
COLO. Rpv.STAT. § 16-11-101 (1978 & Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-35 (1972 &

West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-5-1 to -5-3 (Smith-Hurd 1973 & Supp.
1981-1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-1A-7 (Burns 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:44-1 (West
Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-12 to -18-21 (1981); N.C. GN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4
(Supp. 1979).
104. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (West Supp. 1982).

105. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2151-2155 (Purdon 1981).
106. WASH. RaV. CODE. ANN. §§ 9.94A.010-.94A.910 (Supp. 1982).
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midpoint-for various combinations of offense severity and prior
criminality and authorize judges to impose other sentences only for
"substantial and compelling" reasons.10 7 Sentences outside the
guidelines can be appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.10 8 At
the present time, sentencing commissions in Pennsylvania and
Washington are in the process of developing presumptive sentencing guidelines for their states.109
D. Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Mandatory minimum sentence laws generally require imposition of a prison sentence that is not less than a specified length.
Massachusetts' Bartley-Fox law,110 for example, requires a
mandatory minimum prison sentence of one year without suspension, parole, or furlough for anyone who is convicted of illegally
carrying a firearm." Similarly, the Michigan Felony Firearm Statute11 " mandates a two-year prison sentence-in addition to any
sentence for the underlying felony-for any defendant who possesses a firearm while engaging in a felony. 1 " New York's Rockefeller Drug Law imposes minimum prison sentences of fifteen, six,
and one years for persons who are convicted of various heroin traf114
ficking offenses.
Most major law reform bodies have disapproved mandatory
minimum sentencing laws. 1 5 Nevertheless, mandatory minimum
sentencing schemes are the single most common recent sentencing
innovation.116 In 1980 the Department of Justice reported that
twenty-seven states had adopted mandatory minimum sentence
laws between 1977 and 1980, and that fourteen other states were
107. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
and Commentary, § II. D. [hereinafter cited as Minnesota Guidelines]. See id. § II. C.
108. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.11 (West Supp. 1982) (authorizes such appellate review of
a sentence on request of either the state or the defendant).
109. See Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines,
12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 431 (Jan. 23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Pennsylvania Guidelines]; WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 9.94A.040-.94A.070 (Supp. 1982).
110. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10 (West Supp. 1981).
111. Id.; see Beha, supra note 8.
112.

MICH. Comp.

LAws ANN.

§

750.227b (Supp. 1982-1983).

113. Id.; see Heumann & Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea
Bargaining: The Michigan Felony FirearmStatute, 13 LAw & Soc'y REV. 393 (1979).
114. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 7.

115. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 16, § 18-2.1 (2d ed. approved Aug. 1979).
116. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 350-52 (1968).
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considering similar action. 11 7
E. Parole Abolition
The term "parole abolition" is a misnomer. Most states that
have abolished parole release retain short mandatory periods of
parole supervision that include the possibility of parole revocation. 118 Many states that have eliminated parole release in general
have retained parole systems for small categories of offenders who
continue to receive indeterminate sentences. 11 ' At least nine states
have followed Maine's lead and abolished parole release for most
prisoners.120
F. Plea Bargaining Bans
Plea bargaining provides prosecutors with great influence in
the sentencing process, especially under presumptive sentencing
laws that determine sentences by the nature of the charges filed or
not dismissed. 1 Some localities have attempted to ban some or all
forms of plea bargaining.1 2 2 The most dramatic effort to abolish
plea bargaining remains the Alaska Attorney General's 1975 direc12
tive banning all prosecutorial participation in plea bargaining. 3
G. Summary
The reform initiatives outlined above address the perceived
defects of indeterminate sentencing. Normative standards and limitations on prosecutorial, judicial, and parole board discretion can
117. U.S. Dept. of Justice Press Release (March 23, 1980); see Note, Daring the
Courts: Trial and Bargaining Consequences of Minimum Penalties, 90 YALE L.J. 597
(1981).
118. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3000, 3053 (West Supp. 1982) (sets maximum parole supervision periods and creates Board of Prison Terms to administer parole supervision); IND. CoDE ANN. § 11-13-3-5 (Burns 1981) (maximum parole supervision periods).
119. California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine and Minnesota have abolished parole, although most have retained a period of parole supervision as a consequence of a prison
sentence.
120. Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, and North Carolina have abolished parole release. See NATIONAL INSTrruT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, ABOLISH PAROLE? (1978).
121. Under presumptive sentencing procedures the prosecutor can determine the
prison sentence by electing which charges to file or dismiss and also by deciding what enhancements and prior prison sentences to charge and prove. See supra notes 95-109 and
accompanying text.
122. See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 563-76. See generally Church, Plea Bargains,
Concessions, and the Courts: Analysis of a Quasi-Experiment, 10 LAw & Soc'y REv. 377
(1976).
123.

See supra text accompanying note 3.

SENTENCING REFORM

1982]

rationalize sentencing, reduce disparity, enhance accountability,
and diminish the likelihood of various forms of invidious discrimination. These sentencing reforms, however, are in an important respect only half-measures. Although purporting to reject the institutional manifestations of the rehabilitative ideology that underlies
indeterminate sentencing, the reforms operate within the context
of criminal laws that are the product of precisely the same rehabilitative ideology. The Model Penal Code, for example, was avowedly rehabilitative in its premises and provisions and was designed
to meet the needs of indeterminate sentencing.12' Part IV of this
Article argues that criminal codes drafted under the influence of
indeterminate sentencing are inadequate and suggests that these
criminal codes will frustrate modern sentencing reform initiatives
unless the sentencing reform movement broadens its focus to include criminal law reform.

IV.

THE IRRELEVANCE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN INDETERMINATE
SENTENCING

A.

The Paradox of Sentencing

The defendant at trial stands protected by a formidable array
of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary rights. The common
law requires strict construction of penal statutes; courts must resolve statutory ambiguities in the defendant's favor.1 1 5 The defendant may be convicted only after a finding of guilt based on proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.12 6 Prophylactic evidentiary rules limit
the evidence that the state may introduce to convict the defendant.1 7 In addition, a defendant is entitled to various procedural
protections, including the right to counsel,1 28 the right to confront
accusers, 12 ' and the right to present evidence in his own behalf.130
If the defendant is convicted, he may appeal on the grounds that
evidentiary rules were inappropriately applied, that the evidence
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 Commentary (1962). See generally Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425

(1968).
125. See, e.g., J. HALL,

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 35-39 (2d ed. 1960).
126. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
127. See, e.g., FED. R. EViD. 404, 405. See generally Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 760-61 (1980).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
129. Id.

130. Id. See generally ABA

PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES

211-12 (1968).

§ 4.3(a) commentary at
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adduced at trial does not support the conviction, or that essential
trial or pretrial safeguards were lacking.
Most of these protections are absent during the sentencing
stage. Indeed, sentencing in most jurisdictions is a mystery. The
judge has immense discretion to impose a wide range of
sentences-often ranging from probation to lengthy prison
terms-and that discretion is rarely subject to any meaningful constraints. Most statutory maximum sentences are very long-much
longer than the prison sentences that typically are imposed or
served.""1 The prosecution does not have to meet any burden of
proof standard at sentencing proceedings, and the rules of evidence
do not apply. The sentencing judge may consider any information
that he considers relevant, including allegations of prior criminality that did not result in arrest, that resulted in arrest but no conviction, or even that resulted in a dismissal or an acquittal at
trial.13 2 Even though a defendant has been charged with armed
robbery but convicted only of theft, the judge nevertheless may
impose the sentence he would have imposed if the defendant had
been convicted of armed robbery. Thus, the substantive law matters only to the extent that it authorizes maximum sentences that
often have little practical significance. Finally, in many jurisdictions no right to appeal a sentence exists, and when it does exist, it
generally appears to be ineffective.133
This litany of distinctions between adjudication and sentencing suggests that adjudication is the important decision and that
sentencing is subsidiary. In theory this proposition is true, but the
reality is to the contrary. A substantial majority of convictions result from guilty pleas, which often follow plea negotiations.13 ' The
vast array of evidentiary rules, burdens of proof, and other trial
rights are irrelevant to these defendants, although sometimes
counsel may tactically invoke these rights during plea negotiations.
In these cases the substantive criminal law is substantially attenuated, if not wholly insignificant. If sentence bargaining is preva131. For example, the maximum sentence for robbery under several federal statutes is
25 years (300 months). In 1976 the average federal prisoners released from prison for the
first time had served 44.4 months of an average sentence of 131.3 months. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-

Tics-1978, table 6.61.
132. See United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1975). See generally
Schulhofer, supra note 127, at 765.
133. See Zeisel & Diamond, Search for Sentencing Equity: Sentence Review in Massachusetts and Connecticut, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 881.
134. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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lent, then the conviction offense is of little consequence. If charge
bargaining is prevalent, the defendant pleads guilty to an offense
less serious than that which was charged originally. The conviction
offense, therefore, is at best an uncertain guide to the offender's
crime.
B.

The Irrelevance of the CriminalLaw

Reliance on plea negotiation is a major cause of the diminished importance of adjudication and the resultant deemphasis on
the criminal law. The relationship between indeterminate sentencing and the criminal law, however, is more complex and in part
explains why plea bargaining has become ubiquitous. This relationship suggests several reasons why the criminal law has become
increasingly irrelevant in recent decades.
1.

Individualized Sentencing and Rehabilitation

The theoretical premises of indeterminate sentencing require
that the sentencing judge tailor sanctions to fit the defendant. 13 5 A
judge, therefore, can legitimately consider during the sentencing
process any information-whatever its nature or source-that may
be relevant to the sentencing determination. The Supreme Court
in Williams v. New York 3 6 held that the determination of evidentiary relevancy at sentencing hearings was solely within the discretion of the sentencing judge.13 7 This evidentiary latitude accorded
to sentencing judges even extends to the consideration of alleged
but unproven prior criminal acts.13 8 The Court in Williams reasoned that individualized sentencing requires judges to have access
to all relevant information.13 This stance was not remarkable in
the rehabilitative penological climate of the 1940's. The effect of
Williams, however, was to diminish the importance of a defendant's conviction offense. A defendant charged with armed robbery, but convicted by a jury of theft, may later be sentenced as if
he had been convicted of armed robbery. The conviction offense,
therefore, has little, if any, relevance to sentencing.
135. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
136. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
137. See also United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (reaffirming Williams' evidentiary discretion).
138. Compare FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (prior bad acts may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence) with id. 609 (limitations on admissibility of prior convictions).
139. 337 U.S. at 247.
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Plea Bargaining and the Law

Since substantive criminal law analysis has few implications
for sentencing after Williams, lawyers have little reason to argue
vigorously over the proper application of the criminal law. The defendant is concerned primarily about whether he will be convicted,
and, if so, whether he will be imprisoned. If conviction for some
offense appears inevitable, the defense lawyer can best serve a client either by keeping the client out of prison or by attaining the
shortest possible sentence. The defendant who makes a sentence
bargain knows his punishment when he pleads guilty. The effect of
a charge bargain, however, is less predictable. Arrangements with
prosecutors over the charge that will be filed can provide real protection, since in most jurisdictions dismissal of felony charges for a
misdemeanor plea guarantees that the defendant will not be sentenced to the state penitentiary. Sometimes, of course, charge bargains provide no more than insurance against long sentences. For
example, if the defendant pleads guilty to robbery, which often has
a ten year maximum sentence, in exchange for the dismissal of an
armed robbery charge, which frequently carries a twenty-five year
maximum sentence, this arrangement at least provides protection
against extremely long sentences.
The prospect or certainty of less severe sentences than would
otherwise obtain provides the impetus for guilty pleas. Under indeterminate sentencing procedures, the alternative to a plea bargain
is to risk sentencing by a judge, who is subject to no meaningful
standards and accorded great statutory latitude. Sentencing by the
court entails the risk of an extremely severe sentence relative to
sentences received by other defendants for that offense. Thus, the
defense lawyer must concern himself with sentencing rather than
with either the substantive law or the appropriate conviction
offense.
3.

Moral Incoherence of the Criminal Law

The theoretical underpinnings of indeterminate sentencing
undermine the substantive criminal law in other ways. Professor
Zimring implores the "moral incoherence of the criminal law" and
refers to the modern tendency of legislatures to draft penal statutes broadly to encompass a wide variety of behaviors.140 Many
140. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, HASTINGS CENmR REP. December, 1976, at 13, 15-16.

1982]

SENTENCING REFORM

627

statutory robbery definitions and related sanction provisions, for
example, include conduct that ranges from professional, violent
bank robberies to a fifteen year old's forcible taking of a basketball
in a school year.1"" Judges, lawyers, and probation officers distinguish between these acts. The criminal law, however, often falls to
address even gross distinctions within a broad statutory offense.
This failure creates a shadow criminal law within the sentencing
process that distinguishes among cases in ways that the criminal
law does not.
Reformers have not addressed this incoherence in the criminal
law. Section 1721(1) of the Proposed Federal Criminal Code of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws14 provides that "[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury upon
another, or threatens another with imminent bodily injury." Other
subsections grade robberies as Class A, Class B, or Class C offenses
for the possession or use of a dangerous weapon, 43 the infliction of
serious bodily injury,1 44 or the presence of an accomplice.1 45 The
bulk of robberies, however, fall within the general definition of section 1721(1). This definition, therefore, provides no basis for a
judge to distinguish among schoolyard thefts accompanied by
threats, muggings, robberies of the elderly, and professional bank
robberies. Reasonable people will differ in their assessments of the
relative seriousness of these different robberies. Few people, however, would regard all these acts as equally evil and deserving of
equal punishment. Thus, the shadow criminal law discriminates
among kinds of conduct that the criminal codes fail to distinguish.
This moral incoherence of the criminal law is most acute at
the federal level. Under the mail fraud statutes, for example, the
prosecution need only prove the existence of a "scheme or artifice
to defraud" and the use of the mails in furtherance thereof.1 4 Although the statute requires proof of "specific intent, ' 147 the
factfinder may infer intent from all the surrounding circumstances.14" The courts have refused to define "scheme to defraud"
141.
142.

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (Official Draft 1962).
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A

NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970) [hereinafter cited as STUDY DRAFT].

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. § 1721(2).
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
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with precision, but instead have
established that a "scheme to defraud" need not result in actual pecuniary or
property loss to any victim nor need the scheme be contrary to state or federal law. Rather, the governing standard seems to be that of fair play, an
obviously elusive standard upon which to make the question of criminal liability turn. 14

The vagueness of the mail fraud statute gives rise to the federal prosecutorial maxim "when in doubt, charge mail fraud" 150
and illustrates the prosecutorial advantages that inhere in a
broadly phrased criminal statute. Use of the mails is seldom difficult to prove. Moreover, the elasticity of the "scheme to defraud"
language has permitted federal prosecutors to initiate mail fraud
prosecutions in response to the temper of the times. Thus, federal
prosecutors have invoked the mail fraud statute in many recent
political corruption prosecutions. 151 The proverbial visitor from another planet would be surprised to learn that the venal indiscretions of Governor Kerner of Illinois, Governor Mandel of Maryland, and Governor Blanton of Tennessee were all prosecuted
under the mail fraud statute.
Arguably, the federal mail fraud statutes and other similar
federal statutes such as the Hobbs Act,15 2 the Travel Act, 5 ' the
wire fraud statute,1 " and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act 55 serve important law enforcement interests.
These statutes permit prosecutions in cases that otherwise would
fall outside the criminal code. The elements of the crimes are relatively easy to prove, and the statutes can be directed to meet contemporary needs. For example, since no federal statute criminalizes local political corruption and local prosecutors cannot be relied
upon to prosecute these cases, mail fraud becomes a useful federal
weapon. The mail fraud statute thus permits federal authorities to
416 U.S. 972 (1974).
149. Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalizationof Fiduciary Breaches and the ProblematicLine Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CrM.L. REv. 117,
127 (1981). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
150. Coffee, supra note 149, at 126.
151. Governor Mandel of Maryland, Governor Kerner of Illinois, and Governor Blanton of Tennessee all were convicted under the mail fraud statute. See United States v.
Mandel, 602 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1979) (Mandel); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (Kerner); United States v. Blanton. No. 8030253 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 1981), appeal filed, No. 81-5644 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 1981)
(Blanton).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
155. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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proceed without waiting for Congress to enact a federal statute
prohibiting local political corruption.
Congress' implicit delegation to federal prosecutors of the
power to determine what behavior will constitute federal offenses
creates separation of powers and federalism problems. Federal
prosecutors may abuse their power to criminalize behavior and to
extend federal criminal law into areas that are more appropriately
within the province of the states-or into areas that Congress
would not have expressly authorized.
The mail fraud statute and other similar federal laws illustrate
the same ambivalence toward the criminal law that characterizes
sentencing in the state criminal courts. Under indeterminate sentencing procedures, the substantial protections afforded defendants are largely symbolic because most defendants plead guilty.
In addition, the rehabilitative sentencing ideology authorizes the
sentencing judge to look beyond the defendant's conviction offense
to determine the appropriate sentence. Thus, the conviction is a
formality; the critical decisionmaking and distinguishing function
occurs during the sentencing process. Similarly, the conviction
under the mail fraud statute can be a formality that bears no close
moral relation to the defendant's wrongdoing. It serves simply to
subject the defendant to the court's sentencing authority, under
which the judge can assess the moral quality of the defendant's
acts and determine the appropriate punitive response.
Informal defenses also contribute to the moral incoherence of
the criminal law. The substantive criminal law contains formal defenses that are classified as excuses, 156 justifications, 157 and mitigation.1 58 These defenses are formal because they relate to the formal
application of the criminal law. Judges, however, often consider informal mitigating defenses when setting sentences. Youth, inexperience, motive, contrition, unemployment, and mental subnormality are examples of the informal considerations that the
substantive criminal law does not recognize, but which may be
taken into account during sentencing. The Model Penal Code, for
example, states that in most contexts the victim's consent to an
assault is no defense.1 59 Prosecutors and judges, however, routinely
dismiss family assault cases if the victim elects to drop the prosecution. Similarly, repayment of stolen or embezzled money is not a
156.

See, e.g.,

157.
158.

See, e.g., id. § 3.04 (self-defense).
See, e.g., id. § 210.3 (1)(b) (provocation).

159.

Id. § 2.11.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§§ 4.01-4.09 (Official Draft 1962) (insanity excuse).
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defense to a criminal charge, 16 0 but prosecutors and judges often
dismiss the charges if repayment is made. These cases require decisionmakers to draw normative and moral distinctions without guidance from the criminal code.
Under an indeterminate sentencing scheme, the criminal law
purposely fails to address the moral grading of offenses and informal defenses. Criminal code draftsmen delegated to the judge the
authority to take these considerations into account during sentencing. Thus, the moral incoherence of the criminal law enhances the
importance of the sentencing stage. Many sentencing initiatives of
recent years, however, attempt to establish a closer relation between the offender's wrongdoing and his punishment. Successful
sentencing reform, therefore, will require major revisions of the
substantive criminal law.

V.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN REFORM

The aspects of the criminal law identified above are responsible for the shift in focus of normative distinctions from the criminal law/adjudication stage of the criminal process to the sentencing
stage. The criticisms of indeterminate sentencing-disparity, discrimination, normlessness, irresponsibility, and crime controll"-relate to the quality and consistency of normative distinctions. Recent sentencing reform initiatives, however, have
concerned sanctioning-the back end of the criminal law. Very few
sentencing proposals have addressed the substantive criminal law
itself. This failure to scrutinize the normative distinctions is an
astonishing oversight, since many of the perceived defects in sentencing are the product of the manner in which the criminal law is
formulated. If meaningful changes are to result, comprehensive reform efforts must direct their attention to the substantive law.
Three recent developments suggest a need to focus attention
on the criminal code. First, most sentencing initiatives that have
been implemented under the existing indeterminate sentencing
criminal codes have had little effect on the distribution of
sentences. Second, since plea bargaining is ubiquitous and can eas160.
161.

Id. § 223.8.

But see TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT-REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING app. A
(1976).
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ily frustrate any system of sentencing standards, reformers have
made radical and unprincipled proposals for the control of plea
bargaining under the guise of sentencing reform. Last, reform efforts, especially sentencing and parole guidelines systems, include
attempts to expose the shadow criminal law and to subdivide statutory offenses into categories that draw the moral lines which the
criminal codes lack.

A.

Evaluations of Sentencing Reforms

Evaluations of the effect of recent sentencing reforms consistently point to three broad generalizations about sentencing. 162
First, sentencing officials-judges, parole board hearing examiners,
and prosecutors-must comply with the formal requirements of
new sentencing procedures only if some mechanisms exist to maintain accountability. 1 3 When prosecutors or parole boards establish
detailed policy guidelines along with managerial arrangements to
monitor their employees' decisions, the guidelines are likely to be
applied.' Conversely, if the sentencing procedures do not contain
credible compliance mechanisms, new sentencing standards tend to
have little effect.1 65
Second, sentencing reforms that affect only judicial sentencing
aspects of the criminal justice process appear to have little effect
on sentencing patterns. Mandatory minimum sentence laws, for example, do not increase substantially the likelihood of imprisonment.166 Defendants who would have been imprisoned before
mandatory minimum sentencing are equally likely to be imprisoned under such a scheme. Defendants who clearly would not have
been imprisoned before mandatory minimum sentencing remain
unlikely to be incarcerated. Mandatory minimum sentencing laws,
therefore, increase the likelihood of imprisonment only in marginal
categories of defendants-those who might or might not have gone
to prison before mandatory minimum sentencing took effect. In
addition, an evaluation of California's Uniform Determinate Sen162. The body of social science evaluations of recent sentencing reforms remains
small. For a critical review of recent studies of the effects of sentencing reforms, see RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 41, ch. 4.
163.
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tencing Act 6 7 and Alaska's plea bargaining ban" 8 reflects the conclusion that major sentencing reforms have had little effect on sentencing patterns.
Last, sentencing innovations often significantly affect court
processes and functionings. The adaptive responses of lawyers and
judges have maintained traditional sentencing patterns despite
new institutional arrangements. Thus, one common effect of
mandatory minimum sentencing laws is that more defendants tend
to be diverted or dismissed from the criminal justice process under
a mandatory minimum sentencing scheme than under conventional
sentencing procedures."6 Under New York's Rockefeller Drug
Law, 17 0 for example- the percentages of defendants charged with
drug offenses who were indicted, indicted defendants who were arrested, and arrested defendants who were convicted all steadily declined.1 7 ' The likelihood of imprisonment among those defendants
72
convicted of drug charges, however, increased substantially.1
This minimal effect that sentencing reforms have on sentences
is not surprising. Criminal courts, especially urban felony courts,
are complex organizations; just sentencing is but one of their many
goals. Judges and prosecutors strive to keep cases moving and
backlogs down. Prosecutors desire to maintain high conviction
rates. Because many defense lawyers operate on a high-volume,
low-fee basis, they cannot afford to invest much time or effort into
any single case. On the other hand, defense lawyers at the same
time need to be perceived as useful and effective. Moreover,
lawyers and judges must maintain friendly relations with one
another; if the court's daily and seemingly ceaseless work is to be
accomplished, judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel must
73
cooperate.1
These interests encourage efforts to resolve cases in ways that
serve everyone's ends. Amicable disposition of cases through plea
negotiations embodies the shared interests of everyone, including
the defendant. When sentencing reforms threaten recognized conventions and traditional expectations, lawyers and judges find nu167.
168.
169.
170.

171.
172.

See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3.
See RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 41, ch. 4.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 41, ch. 4.
Id.

173. See J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINNAL COURTS 45-52, 60-64 (1977).
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merous ways to adapt and to carry on business as *usual.This behavior is not necessarily as insidious as it may appear. Judges and
counsel may believe that conventions and expectations are right
and just, and that sentences mandated by new procedures are unjust. Court functionaries may see avoidance of new sentencing laws
as a necessary step toward avoiding injustice, rather than as an
improper manipulation of the criminal justice process.
Under indeterminate sentence laws, the criminal codes offer
the judge little guidance in sentencing. Statutory maximum
sentences are often ten, twenty, twenty-five years, or longer. Generic offense definitions force judges to make their own moral discrimination among crimes. This combination of great power and
few standards induces the judge to share the responsibility with
plea-bargaining counsel. 17 4 Moreover, under indeterminate sentencing laws, the alternative to a plea bargain is to risk sentencing
by a judge, who possesses great unregulated and unreviewable sentencing power. Defendants accordingly desire assurances either
from counsel or through a plea bargain that the range of possible
sentences is tolerable. This combination of the judge's great powers, the absence of standards, the functional and psychological
benefits of shared responsibility for sentences, and the defendant's
need for reassurance fosters a collegial system of case disposition.
This tradition, which is firmly rooted in many jurisdictions, explains why many sentencing reforms have had little perceptible effect on sentences and why they instead have caused lawyers and
judges to modify their practices to achieve traditional sentencing
results. If sentencing innovations are to significantly change existing sentencing patterns, sentencing reforms must address the
structural features of the criminal code.

B.

Criminal Law Reconstitution

The numerous efforts to recognize normative distinctions in
sentencing standards suggest the importance of the criminal law in
sentencing. Following the lead of the United States Parole Commission, many jurisdictions have developed guidelines that specify
174. In evaluating the Alaska plea bargaining ban, some judges and lawyers complained that the ban impoverished sentencing by converting what had been a collegial interactive process into an individual and idiosyncratic one. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra

note 3, at 30-32.
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a recommended range of sanctions for any combination of offense
and offender. The development of guidelines requires that the seriousness of different crimes and the relevance of various offender
circumstances be considered. Thus, guideline developers must consider whether the criminal code or the offenses of which defendants are convicted reflect the necessary moral distinctions. If the
criminal code fails to distinguish between the professional bank
robber and the teenaged basketball thief, then sentencing guidelines must either ignore the obvious differences or create new distinctions. Sentencing reforms have tended to do the latter.
Many sentencing reform efforts reclassify felonies when developing sentencing guidelines, which is a reaction that illustrates
even further the criminal law's normative inadequacy. Modern
criminal codes either classify all felonies into a small number of
classes or implicitly scale severity by specifying maximum lawful
sentences. 1 5 Sentencing guideline drafters, however, often ignore
these statutory classes and draft new distinctions. The Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines Commission and the United States Parole
Commission, for example, have developed their own offense severity rankings. Drafters developed the severity ratings by conducting
exercises in which the commissioners were asked to rate all regularly recurring crimes. The commissioners then negotiated the differences between the ratings. The Commissions subsequently
adopted the resultant offense severity scale, notwithstanding the
inconsistencies both with applicable criminal statutes and with the
ratings implied by the maximum sentences authorized for each
crime.1 78
The criminal law's normative inadequacy is also demonstrated
by the guidelines developers' efforts to subcategorize the criminal
code's substantive offense definitions so that sentencing and parole
standards will incorporate gradations of harm and culpability that
the substantive law does not recognize. Similarly, the original Denver descriptive guidelines contained a category for unqualified robbery, but provided for sentence enhancement if a weapon was
used, if an injury was inflicted, or if death resulted. 7 The Minne175. The Model Penal Code, for example, provides for three felony classes. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 6.01 (official Draft 1962).
176. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF SENTENCING POLICIES ON PRISON POPULATIONS 5, 6 fig. 2 (1980); HOFFMAN, BECK & DEGOSTIN,
The PracticalApplication of a Severity Scale in PAROLE: LEGAL ISSUES/DECISION-MAKING
RESEARCH

177.

169-87 (1975).
See supra text accompanying notes 66-70; see also J. KRESS, supra note 92, pas-
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sota Sentencing Guidelines created four "aggravated forgery"
offenses from one statutory offense.17 The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing subcategorized one statutory burglary definition into four different kinds of burglary. 17 9 These efforts to subclassify categories of conduct demonstrate that criminal statutes
draw distinctions that are excessively gross and overly generic. Reform efforts, therefore, must incorporate these reclassifications into
the criminal law.

C. Real Offense Sentencing

As noted earlier,180 most convictions are the result of plea negotiation. Under conventional plea bargaining procedures, the defendant is convicted of the offense that he admits to rather than
the offense that he committed. This conviction discrepancy
presents no difficulty under an indeterminate sentencing scheme
because the sentencing judge can disregard the conviction offense
and consider the defendant's actual offense. The discrepancy, however, does pose a dilemma under determinate sentencing laws. Sentencing decisions must be based either on the conviction offense,
and thus be subject to manipulation by plea bargaining counsel, or
be based on the underlying criminal behavior, and thereby make
explicit the irrelevance of the defendant's trial rights. After Minnesota abandoned parole release, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission debated whether to base its sentencing guidelines on the conviction offense, which could be an artifact of plea
bargaining, or on the defendant's real offense. Table 2 sets out the
guidelines matrix that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission developed. All felonies are divided into ten categories and
are shown on the vertical axis.

sim; L. WILKINS, supra note 5, at 65.

178. Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 107, table V; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.625
(1964).
179. Proposed Pennsylvania Guidelines, supra note 109, at 434; see 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3502 (Purdon 1973).
180. See supra notes 121-23 & 134 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2
MINNESOTA SENTENCING MATRIX: SENTENCING BY
SEVERITY OF OFFENSE AND CRIMINAL HISTORY
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
SEVERITY LEVELS OF

0

CONVICTION OFFENSE

Unauthorized Use of
Motor Vehicle
Possession of Marijuana
Theft-related Crimes
($150-$2500)

111

2

3

14

15

6 or more

1

12*

12*

12"

15

18

21

24

II

12*

12"

14

17

20

23

27
25-29

12*

13

16

19

22
22
21-23

27
25
25-29

32
30
30-34

Burglary - Felony Intent
Receiving Stolen Goods
IV
($5-20)24-26

12"

15

18

21

25
25

V

18

23

27

30
23
29-31

Assault, 2nd Degree

VI

Aggravated Robbery
Assault, Ist Degree
Criminal Sexual Conduct,
1st Degree

VII

21
24
23-25
43
41-45

26
32
30-34
54
50-58

30
41
38-44
65
60-70

34
33-35
49
45-53
76
71-81

Sale of Marijuana

Theft Crimes ($150-$2500)

Il

Murder, 2nd Degree

VIII

X

97
94-100
116
111-121

41
4

37-45

38
36
36-40

46
4 9
43-49

54
50
50-58

44
42-46
65
60-70
95
89-101

54
50-58
81
75-87
113
106-120

65
60-70
97
90-104
132
124-140

119
127
149
176
205
116-122 124-130 143-155 168-184 195-215
140
162
203
243
284
133-147 153-171 192-214 231-255 270-298

230
218-242
324
309-339

($150-$2500)

Simple Robbery

32
32

30-34

1st Degree Murder is excluded from the guidelines by law and continues to have a mandatory life
sentence.
*

one year and one day
Source: Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Report to the Legislature 14 (1980)

The prior criminal records of defendants are divided into seven
groups, which are arrayed on the horizontal axis. To ascertain the
applicable guideline sentence, the judge determines the severity
level of the conviction offense and the defendant's criminal history
source. The cell located at the intersection of the appropriate row
and column indicates the number of months that the defendant
must serve. The cells below the jagged bold line contain a guideline
sentence and a sentencing range. The judge may impose any sentence within this narrow range. Since the conviction offense determines the presumptive sentence, the defense counsel's ability to
negotiate the defendant's plea determines the defendant's sentence. Notwithstanding this problem, the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission decided that to base its guidelines on any
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offense other than the conviction offense would raise insurmountable problems of fairness: "Offense severity is determined by the
offense of conviction .... [S]erious legal and ethical problems

would be raised if punishment were to be determined on the basis
of alleged, but unproven, behavior."' 81 The question remains
whether the Minnesota guidelines will shift power to lawyers and
whether lawyers will use that power to manipulate and circumvent
the sentencing guidelines.
Other options were available to the Minnesota Commission.
One leading proposal would have acknowledged the pressures that
give rise to plea bargaining and would have attempted to confine
plea bargaining's scope through "charge reduction guidelines."182
These guidelines would have specified the amount by which a defendant's sentence could be reduced if he pleaded guilty. The
guidelines thus would have authorized judges to award only the
prescribed "guilty plea discount."15 3
The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act,1 84 which provides

for a sentencing commission and a presumptive sentencing guideline system, offers a different solution to the problem of circumventing sentencing guidelines. The Uniform Law Commissioners
have attempted to counter charge bargains by basing sentences on
"actual offense behavior."1 85 The pertinent comment explains:
"[T]he language, nature and circumstance of the offense authorizes
the sentencing court to consider offense behavior rather than

...

the offense for which the defendant was ultimately convicted. The
major purpose of the provision is to reduce disparity resulting from
the effect of plea bargaining."186 Unfortunately, the Model Act

tends to trivialize the criminal process and thus is fundamentally
flawed. For example, consider three defendants, each of whom has
committed and been indicted for armed robbery. The first is convicted at trial of armed robbery, the second pleads guilty to robbery and the armed robbery charge is dismissed, and the third is
tried by a jury and convicted only of theft. Under the real offense
181. See Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 107, comment II.A.01.
182.

See S.

SCHULHOFER,

1

PROSECUTORIAL DIsCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING RE-

10 (Federal Judicial Center Report 1979); 2 id. at 47; Schulhofer, supra note 127, at
745. Several federal criminal code reform bills have included this proposal. See S. 1722, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 6233, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
183. See von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 1, at 312-15.
FORM

184.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, MODEL SENTENCING

AND CORRECTIONs

ACT (Approved Draft 1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].

185. Id. §§ 3-115, -206(d).
186. Id. § 3-115(b) comment at 144-45.

638

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:607

provision of the Model Act, all three defendants would be sentenced for armed robbery. This repugnant result trivializes the
substantive law, the law of evidence, the defendant's procedural
rights, and the criminal burden of proof. At the same time, indeterminate sentencing laws and the practices in most criminal
courts today achieve the same regrettable results.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The principal argument of this Article is that sentencing reform efforts have been partially misconceived because they ignore
the substantive criminal law-an inattention that is an inherent
aspect of indeterminate sentencing. The dilemmas which guideline
draftsmen face confirm that determinate sentencing has drawn
tighter the relationship between crime and punishment.18 7 If sentencing innovations are to diminish sentencing injustices materially, reform must include four elements.
First, reformers must revise criminal codes substantially to reflect the morally salient features of criminal conduct. The Model
Penal Code provides the basis of most state criminal codes. The
intellectual roots of the Model Penal Code, however, are in the
1950's and reflect the rehabilitative goals of that time. Model Penal Code sentence maximums are long to allow for those whose rehabilitative needs require lengthy detention. Drafters of the Code
anticipated that parole boards would shorten sentences routinely.
Although offenses are defined in broad generic terms, judges may
consider salient offense circumstances and thereby individualize
the sentences that they impose. Consequently, developers of sentencing and parole guidelines systems have attempted to specify
detailed criteria for decisionmaking and have had to define salient
distinctions among crimes in terms that are much more detailed
and specific than the offense definitions found in criminal codes. 18
Defining crime, however, is the quintessential legislative function
to which guideline developers have been driven by the legislatures'
failure to act. Legislatures, therefore, must return the task of drawing moral distinctions to the adjudicative stage where it belongs.
Second, legislatures should shorten to realistic levels the enormously long maximum sentences that are prevalent under inde187. See supra notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
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terminate sentencing laws. Long maximum sentences permit "bark
and bite" sentencing-the judge's bark and the parole board's bite.
The abandonment of parole release, which has occurred in ten
states,6 9 makes lengthy maximum sentences unnecessary and invites disparate and aberrant sentences. If criminal statutes authorize judges to impose any sentence from probation to twenty-five
years, sentences naturally will span that range. For the same offense, lawful sentences that range from probation to five years
would narrow the range of disparity and reduce the likelihood of
aberration.
Legislatures can reduce sentence maximums in several ways.
The simplest and most honest method, which has been proposed in
Great Britain by the Advisory Council on the Penal System and in
Canada by the Law Reform Commission, is to amend the criminal
code to establish much shorter maximum sentences.'9 0 The Study
Draft of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws reduces statutory maximums through sleight of hand.' 91 Although the nominal maximums are conventional-Class A, twentyfive years; Class B, fifteen years; and Class C, seven years-the effective maximum sentences for most offenders are three and four
years, since a mandatory parole term-five years, three years, and
two years-is included within each maximum sentence. Table 3
sets out the National Commission Proposal. Longer sentences are
reserved within each offense class for exceptional cases in which
the judge makes a special finding that the defendant "presents an
exceptional risk to the safety of the public."1 2
Regardless of the method chosen, reduction of sentence maximums should be a primary goal of sentencing reform. Otherwise,
the long sentence maximums of indeterminate sentencing systems
will continue to frustrate efforts to reduce disparities in sentencing. Although lengthy sentence maximums occupied a logical position in the era of indeterminate sentencing, they have no place in
the current period of reform.

189.

See supra note 120 and accompanying text.

190.

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE PENAL SYSTEM, SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT-A REVIEW OF MAXIMUM PENALTIES 77-88, 147-64 (1978); LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, STUDIES ON IMPRISONMENT (pt. 2) 21-22 (1975).

191. STUDY DRAFT,supra note 142, at §§ 3201-3202.
192. Id. § 3202(3)-(5). The "exceptional risk" assessment includes situations in which
the defendant is a "persistent felony offender," a "professional criminal," or a "dangerous,
mentally abnormal offender." Id.
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TABLE 3
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS:
NOMINAL AND ACTUAL MAXIMUM SENTENCES
ACTUAL
WITHOUT SPECIAL

ACTUAL

FELONY CLASS*

NOMINAL

FINDING

WITH SPECIAL FINDING

A
B
C

30 years
15 years
7 years

15 years
4 years
3 years

25 years
12 years
5 years

The vast majority of felonies, and felons, would fall within Felony classes B
and C and thus, ordinarily, be subject to terms of incarceration not longer
than 3 or 4 years. An enormous amount of sentencing disparity would
disappear.

Source: National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft
§§ 3201-3202 (1970).

Third, reformers must develop detailed sentencing standards
that provide clear guidance to judges and permit them to use discretion when appropriate. Minnesota's sentencing guidelines system provides the most hopeful model for reform. 98 The Minnesota
system prescribes narrow ranges within which sentences should be
imposed in ordinary cases, but permits judges, subject to appellate
sentence review, to depart from these ranges if they provide written explanations of the "substantial and compelling circumstances." 1 This sentencing system attaches high priority to equal
treatment, but avoids the problems of fixed and mechanical
applications.
Last, legislatures should establish appellate review of
sentences and provide adequate material support. Although
sentencing affects a defendant's most fundamental interests, defendants in most states are unable to obtain review of their
sentences.'" The lack of detailed sentencing criteria, long maximum sentences, and parole board release powers impede effective
appellate review under indeterminate sentencing. Appellate review,
however, should be more practicable under new sentencing laws.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, appears to be monitoring the Minnesota sentencing guidelines with some vigor.
193.
194.

See supra notes 178 & 180-81 and accompanying text.
See Minnesota Guidelines, supra note 107.

195. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEw OF SEsTnNCES (Approved Draft 1968).
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These four changes would make the American criminal process
similar to those of other countries. Plea bargaining as the primary
form of case disposition, for example, is a uniquely American phenomenon. Similarly, the combination of long sentences with parole
discretion for shortening sentences routinely by half is peculiarly
American. Parole release, for example, was not established in England until 1967, and West Germany and Scandinavia use parole to
reduce prison sentences only by increments that are measurable in
months."" In addition, the United States is the only major common-law country that lacks a tradition of vigorous appellate review
7
of sentences.

19

The sentencing reform movement has made major progress in
developing decision rules and increasing official accountability. If
attention is now refocused to include substantive criminal law in
the sentencing process, the result could be a system in which crime
and punishment are closely related, and in which the law recognizes the enormity of the issues at stake when depriving citizens of
their liberty.

196. See R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 280 (6th ed. 1972).
197. The Australian Law Reform Commission recently pointed out that in virtually all
common law jurisdictions "with the exception of the United States, appellate review of
sentences has been the main method adopted to achieve consistency in, and develop principles for, the imposition of punishment." AuSTEALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, SENTENCING OF
FEDERAL OFFENDERS 360 (1980).

